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SLAVE,

UNLESS

England

Break Her

CHAINS:

Discovering the Grand Designs of the French-Popish Party in

ENGLAND

for feveral Years past.

LONDON,

Printed for W. D. and are to be sold in London and Westminster. 1681.

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EUROPE a Slave

Unless

ENGLAND

Break her CHAINS.

Itian Majesty has lately enterprized upon Valencienmes, Cambray, and St. Omers, the best Fortified places of the Spanish Netherlands, and the only remaining Bulwarks of those Poor Provinces toward France, together with the Progress of his Armes upon the Frontiers of Germany, the Confines of Spain, in Sicilie and in America, gives all the rest

rest of Europe occasion to be solidly apprehensive of its danger: which is it were, perhaps it might have been more advantagious for this great Monarch not to have done so much.

In truth, by the rapid Conquests which this Victorious Prince has obtain'd in so short a time, of three fuch important Places, he has apparently demonstrated to all Europe the extent of his great and vast designs; and the weak-ness and low Condition of Spain as palpably discovers, that there is all the reason in the World to believe, that if England would but awake out of that Lethargie wherein it hath layen for fo many years, and put her helping hand to the work, she might be a great means to prevent the misfortunes and Calamities to which all those Estates and Countries that border upon France are now exposed.

I was the more apt to flatter my felf with a hope of this nature,

for that although I am not altogether ignorant, how much the French Court has won upon the Court of England, yet I was of Opinion that the English, being fo invincibly jealous for the pre-fervation of their liberty, finding that his most Christian had made fuch an important Conquest, while the Parliament was fitting, would by the Mediation of that Noble Assembly, have made their humble addreffes and earnest representations to their Monarch, and not have left till they had befought him to confent what his own honour and the fafety of his people required. But by fatal Experience we fee, that as to that which all Europe calls a Parliament, if the same Anticipations, and Connivances continue there with that fatality which we have hitherto obferved', "that to our great forrow, we shall be constrain'd to believe what the Emisfaries B 2

faries of France, publickly themfelves declare, that two thirds of
that Assembly are Caball'd and
manag'd by the Golden Lewis's of
France; in such a manner, that
from the same part from whence
all Europe hope to behold the Sun
of their restauration rise, if there
be not a sudden change, which all
good men expect for all this from
the English Generosity, there they
see a formidable power advance it
self; in Combination with France,
for the utter destruction of Christendom.

I know there are some that pretend to great in light, who being either endu'd or surprized with the Opinions and Maxims which the French Emissaries every where infinuate, are of opinion, that for the Imperialists there might be something done so considerable in the Course of this Gainpaigne, which if it should happen prosperously to succeed, it would follow ((5)

follow then that some folid remedy might be apply'd to cure the mischies and apprehensions of all the rest of Europe. This is that which is discoursed in all the Courts and Countries of the North. But not to distaste these men of Contemplation, I must beg leave to be of a contrary judgment, and to hold that all their hopes are ill grounded; and that for several reasons.

We must consess, there is no improbability but that the Imperial Army might force a way into France, which would certainly prove a notable home thrust but then on the other side we must consider, that the Army which is design'd for such an Expedition must endure all the hardships of a Twenty Leagues March through Countries burnt and wasted, so that such incommoded for want of all forts of necessary Provisions both B? for

for Horse and man. Now. in regard the Imperialists, being once pass'd beyond Mayence, Coblems and Treves, have no Magazines, all the Countrey beyond the Line of Treves to the very Confines of France, except some part of Luxemburgh, being under the absolute Power of the Enemy; this being fo, how is it for us to imagin, that the Imperialists should do any things confiderable, being to March either through a Country burnt and wasted, or through that part of Luxemburgh, which is at prefent a meer Delart, more especially confidering that the German Armies are those of all Europe that carry along with them the most numerous luggage and pesterment of women, and unprofitable mouths.

Secondly, though it were true that the Imperialists surmounting all these difficulties, should break in as far as Lorian, the Territory of Metz,

Metz, or the County of Burgun-dr, which is all that is to be expected in one Campaigne, what is it that this Imperial Army can do considerable, in a Country of which all the strong holds are in the possession of the Enemy, and all the rest of the Country burnt and laid wast? Now as all these exploits of the Imperalifts can tend to no other end, but either to give Battel, or to lay Siege to some considerable Town, it is easie to forefee that if they aime at the first, and that the French are intended to decline it, as they are masters of all the Country behind, and of each fide, who shall be able to force them to fight? Or if it comes to that pals that they are forc'd to hazard a Battel, it is most certain that the one or the other will be Victor. Should then the Imperialists get the better, let us examine what they will be in a condition to do, should they obtain a compleat Victory. I bechief Benefit of fuch a victory will be only the Siege of some good Town, by that means to fecure fome post for the Conveniency of the Army against the next Campaigne. For to venture far into an Enemies Country without this pre-caution, I do not believe that the Imperialists either will or ought to do it. For should they hazard fuch an attempt, they would be conftrain'd to leave feveral frong Garisons behind 'em, which being well stufft with French Cavalry, would never suffer the German Convoys to pass quietly, and perhaps cut off the greatest part of them. But on the other side, suppose the French will avoid fighting, keeping themselves in an actual posture of defence, or though they should be constrain'd to give battel, and lose the day, yet the scatter'd Troops of that, beaten

beaten Army, being spedily re-inforc'dby the adjoyning Garrisons, would be still strong enough; though but in volant parties, to prevent the Imperialists from doing anything confiderable. Here you are to observe that what I have faid already is only in reference to the first Case of the March of the Imperialists in an Enemies Countrey, and the gaining a Victory. But as it would be an extraordinary piece of Flattery to determine, that the Imperialists should be infallibly Victors; I believe, that before we leave this first point, it will not be amis to examin what would probably happen, in case the Armies should joyne, and the French should get the day. Nor do I think it will require a long discourse, to make the reader apprehend the bad confequences of fuch a loss to the Imperialitis. It being notorious that in regard of the ftrong places which ders

which the French possess in Lorain, Burgundy and Alsatia, after the loss of a Battel, Germany would labour under two inevitable mischiefs.

and consequently utterly ruined and cut off in the pursuit. The second to see the French pass the Rhine at Brisgon, and there cutting out such troublesome work for Germany, which yet she never beheld nor had ever suffered in those

parts.

Again if by an attempt no less prosperous than the former, the Emperour and the Empire should make a second tryal, and be so unfortunate as to lose a second Battel, a thing not unlikely, whether this Campaign or the next, considering how the Correspondencies of the French are maintain'd in the Court of Bavaria, and other Courts of the Empire, we must look upon all that part of Germany which borders.

ders upon the Rhine for two or three days journey together totally lost without hopes of recovery, and the rather for that a great part of those Countries is all consum'd and wasted, and can never be able to afford Conveniencies for winter Quarters, nor to supply the Imperial Armies in their Marches. And this is very near as much as I can think observable in case of the March of an Imperial Army in the Enemies Country, and in case of giving Battel, which is the first point. Now let us come to that of laying a Siege.

As to what has pass'd at the sieges of Philipsburgh, and Maestricht, with different Enemies, two things are observable. The first, that the French understand very well how to fortisse their strong holds according to all the Rules of Art. And also for the second, they understand as well how to defend their Fortiscations, & dispute it Inch by Inch with their

their Enemies, with an admirable conduct, and undaunted Courage. From which reflections it may be naturally concluded, that in case the Imperialists, being enter'd into an Enemies Country, go about to lay any formal Siege; as with-out question it must be before some considerable Town, 'tis ten to one but that the feafon of the Campaigne will be over before they can bring their design to pass. From whence I conclude that this March of the Imperial Army, whatever way they take, can never produce any greater benefit, than the tak-ing of some place in Loraine, the Territory of Metz, Luxemburgh, or the County of Burgundy, and by the gain of that place to disorder those Garisons which the French hold in Alfatia, which however is not fufficient to lave the Provinces of the Spanish Netberlands, which is the precise Platform, by which his most Christ an Majesty might with without diffculty mount to the Universal Monarchy, if those Provinces were lost; there being no Power at present in a probable condition to hinder him.

Now if it be true what I have already affirm'd, and what I shall afterwards maintain, that by the Conquest of the united Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, his most Christian Majesty may jump into the Universal Monarchy, that all Europe may evidently know the danger of the present Conjuncture if there be no remedy from England, and other places interested, and that with all the speed imaginable, there are these five things to be attentively considered.

The first is, that his most Christian Majesty being master of all the Posts, Passages, and strong Places of the County of Burginaly, it behaves us to consider, that though this Prince should do nothing more during this whole Campaigne but only

only dispute the Ground with the Imperialists, it is not to be avoided, but that the Campaigne must break up, and the Imperial Army retire without doing any thing considerable for the preservation of the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands: For not to flatter our felves, would we have had the Imperialists have attempted any thing great for the Safety of those Provinces, necessity requir'd that while the Imperialists directed their March undauntedly into the Bowels of France, with an Army of fifty thousand men, the Confederate forces, then in the Spanish Netherlands should have broken into Picardy, or the Territory of Boloigne, by fuch a powerful di-version to have fayour'd the grand and Capital Enterprize of the Imperial Army. But by the fatal loss of Valenciennes, Cambray and St. Omers, France is so well entrench'd on that side against all the:

the Attempts of the Confederate Armes in those parts, that it is absolutely out of their power by reason of those Conquests to penetrate on that fide into the Kingdom of France. Now we may easily perceive, that France having nothing to fear from Flanders, will content it self only to leave a small Army in those Quarters adjoyning to the Provinces of the Spanish. Netherlands, which by the affiftance of those strong Garrisons under its Dominion in the same Provinces, will be a force fufficiently. competent to amuse all the power of the Dutch and Spaniards on that fide during the feafon of this Campaigne, and to prevent their doing any thing considerable.

In the fecond place, This being the condition of Flanders, and France being out of all apprehenfion of danger in reference to its Conquests in the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, and the Provinces

vinces of Picardy, Boloigne and Arnow which are guarded and secur'd
by the Conquests of Valenciennes,
Cambray, and St. Cmers, it plainly
appears that France is at her full liberty, to make head with the main
body of its forces in opposition to
the enterprizes of the Imperial
Armies.

Seeing then that Frante finds her felf in this fafe condition, I must leave it to all men of lence and judgment, as a folid prognostication of all that can be expected from the attempts of the Imperial Armes for the preservation of the Provinces of the Spanish Wetherlands. For suppose that the Imperialists should advance to the Frontiers of France, with an Army of fifty thousand men, which is almost all that they can do, France will meet them with an equal force, or perhaps with a greater number, with this difference, that whereas the Imperialifts, to obtain the VIIICES

Frontiers of France, shall be forc'd to undergo a thousand difficulties and hardships, in crossing a wasted and desolate Country, the French have nothing to do but by easie Marches in their own Countrey to meet them, Masters of all the Territories behind and on each side, furnish'd and provided with all things necessary, and where they had all the advantages imaginable to attack them as they should see occasion.

Thirdly, that we may not seem to rely in vain upon the endeavours of the Confederate Forces in the said Provinces, we must consider, that by reason of the lopping of so many considerable Members from the body of those Provinces in the Wars of 1667, and since the beginning of this present War, it is absolutely impossible to be able to do any thing considerable against France without a force much greater than that of France. Fourth-

Fourthly, The Spaniards them-felves fince the beginning of this War, through the misfortune of the Minority of their Prince, being unable to establish Magazines of Victuals, Ammunition and Provender for the Horse, for the subsi-- france of their own and the Armies of their Allies, and being under the same necessities and disabilities, through the fame misfortune during this Campaigne, it is impossible for this only defect, that any confiderable Armies should subsist in the faid Provinces for to long a time as is requifite, or that the March of the Army should be order'd as the fuddenness of emergent occasions requires, to oppose the progress of the Enemy, or to gain any considerable advantage upon him. And this may ferve for a real proof of this Truth, that we need no more but observe what has pass'd within these three years in the beginning, progress and end of all the Campaignes

paignes in the faid Provinces, including the beginning of

Fifthly, although it be true that by the advancement of his most Serene Higness Don John of Au-Aria to the Dignity of Captain General, and First Minister of the Spanish Monarchy, we may certainly expect a great change in the Government of the Monarchy of Spain, however 'tis very true that if we consider the most wonderful disorders which have crept into the Ministry of that Monarchy during two fuccessive Reigns, the little time that this Heroick Prince has enjoy'd his Dignity, and the necessity that constrains him in the first place to provide for the affairs of Sicily and the Frontiers of Spain, make it out to be impossible for him to furnish sufficient fuccours for the preservation of these Provinces.

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Now all that has been already faid, being folidly true, which may be reduc'd to three heads, First, That the Imperialifts during this Campaign can do nothing considerable for the safety of the United Spanish Netherlands. Secondly, That there is no folid Reliance to be had upon the Enterprizes of those Forces which have defended those Provinces for these 3 years. 13 And, Thirdly, That Don John is not ina capacity to relieve or remedy thefe misfortunes; we must of necessity conclude that his Most Christian Mijesty, at the end of this Cam-paigne, or before the beginning of the next, while the Imperialists and Hollanders are in their Winter Quarters, will be in a condition to Randelvouze a new body of an Army out of his Carrifons in the Frontier Provinces, and with this new Army to come and fiveep all before him, and make an end of his work, by taking all principal places

ces that remain unconquered in the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands; by means whereof the rest will easily submit to the Conquerours Yoke; Neither the Loyalty nor the Courage of the poor Inhabitants being able to protect them from this missortune. And then his Most Christian Majesty will have no more to do but to push forward by Sea and Land his Monarchical Designs, to bring under his Yoke the two thirds of Europe.

But because some Critick may perhaps imagine that my Conclusion in the preceding Paragraph is not folidly enough maintain'd to be established and made a positive maxime, after that manner as I have done it, I think it but necessary before I go any farther, that no person may flatter similarly to the contrary, to shew palpably and plainly the possibilities for his Most Christian Majesty to execute

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Victoriously, by the time by me supposed, what I have advanced for truth. To which purpose I desire the Reader to consider these four things by way of addition.

four things by way of addition.

First, That it is naturally impossible but that the Dutch Army by death, sickness, or desertion must be diminish'd above a third part.

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death, sickness, or desertion must be diminish'd above a third part. Secondly, That in case his most Christian Majesty should under-take any such conquest at the time afore mentioned, it is impossible to determine, but by conjecture, which may prove deceitful, upon which place he will first begin to make his attacques; forthat, sup-posing that the Hollanders do lend their Forces to the Spaniards, there will be a necessity that those Forces should be divided into all those places which the Spaniards possessing the United Provinces; from whence it consequently follows, that it will be impossible that by means of this division and allotment

ment of those Forces, they should be capable to defend all the Grand places which the Spaniards yet possess, which being once attacqu'd and taken, all the rest excepting only Luxemburgh, will be constrain'd to surrender.

Thirdly, it being granted that the Hollanders do lend their Forces to the Spaniards, and that they are divided and separated into several Garrisons as I have already declared, we may certainly conclude, that if his most Christian Majesty has a delign to lit down before the faid places, neither the Hollanders, nor the Spaniards having a body of an army in the Field, as being all distributed into Garrisons, for the security of particular places, He is at his full liberty to attacque which, and as many as he pleases at a time without controul, and coming to be master of the Forts, he is mafter of the Forces likewife : and so the question will be, whether

ther it were not better for them to quit their Towns without fo much as a Summons, than to lose their men. For if we do but make a ferious Reflexion upon the violent and rapid manner of the French Arracques, it being the humour of the present King not to care how many thousand Mens lives he facrifices to his impetuous defires of Conquest, it is naturally impossible but that they should take all the places which they attacque, as being out of all expectance of relief. So that all the Places which remain to the Spaniards in the Low Countries shall be swept away, before the Imperialists can be in a condition to move; I only except Luxemburgh for this year, which upon the next Invalion is to run the fame fortune with Burgundy, and it may be the next Campaign, as being without Garrisons or Forces for its defence; there being nothing more certain than that the Souldiers

Souldiers in the Conquer'd Garrifons will be prisoners of War to the Victor.

We may add for a fourth, not to flatter our felves that the violence of Seafons, or the maxim of keeping in Winter Quarters gives any stop to the French heat, that it behoves us to consider what time his Most Christian Majesty made his first Irruption into the County of Burgundr, and what his Armies have done fince the beginning of this War, all in the Winter time, or at the end of Campaignes, when the Enemies Army was never so little retir'd, or before they could be upon their marchat the end of Winter. Or if we had forgot all this, the fecond invasion of Burgundy, the conquests of Montbellian, Cambray, Valenciennes and St. Omers may refresh our memories. Which in my opinion may fu fice to make us sensible that if England do notstep in before the end of this Campaigne, his most Christian Majesty will be certainly in a condition, at the time which

which I have mention'd, to make a final conquest of all the Spanish Netherlands.

Now his Most Christian Majesty being in fuch a condition, from what you may believe that he will never neglect fuch a favourable conjun-Eture, we are also to take notice, that the faid Monarch out of a fupreme and capital Interest, cannot dispense with the Execution of his intended enterprizes at the time by me already expressed. For the Imperialists at the end of the Campaigne, taking up their Winter Quarters in Loraine and Luxemburgh, his Most Christian Majesty has but one Expedient of Diversion to constrain the Imperial Army of courfe to quit at the begining of the next Campaigne, all the faid Countreys, and to retreat on the other fide of the Rhine, which his most Christian Majestie will easily compel them to do, if the Spanish Provinces or their Principal strong Holds fall at the faid time into his hands. For this

this Conquest being made, his Most Christian Majesty shall not only be in a Condition to keep up an Army of fifty thousand men, upon the Confines of Lorain, the Territory of Merz, and the County of Burgundr, to oppose the Imperialists, but also with an Army of the same force to seize almost without any opposition upon the Counties of Juliers and Cleves, and fo to get footing beyond the Rhine on that fithe Westphalia, to encourage the Princes of his Cabal in those parts, and probably to force the Imperialists, wherever they are ar that time, by reason of the Alarms of which they are so apprehensive from the Coast of Bavaria, which only expects an opportunity for invading Tirol, to keep clole together in a body on the other fide of the Rhine, on purpose to watch the motion of their Enemies.

Now all that has been faid above being brought to pass in this manner, to the end we may believe that his Most Christian Majesty will be in

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a condition to subdue the third part of Europe, we are to take notice once for all, that this same Prince with only the Forces of his own Kingdom, has been able not only to defend himfelf from the confederated Forces of his Enemies, but that to this very time, all that confiderable ftrength has not been able to get one fingle Farm of the ancient Patrimony of his Kingdom, while this fame Prince actually takes without any opposition, from the Principal Chiefs of the Confederacy, Fortreffes, Cities, Towns and whole Provinces; and as if it were not fufficient to advance the Progress of his Victories by Land, in the Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, upon the Frontiers of Germany, upon the Confines of Caralogne, and in Sigily, to the end you may not be ignorant, how formidable his power is everywhere, he gives an occasion to all Europe with amazement to behold, how this same Monarch, within thefetwo years under the pretence

of the Sicilian War has not obtained only the absolute Dominion of the Mediterranean Sea, upon all the Coasts of Spain, Italy, and his own Dominions, but that he has had the courage, and a force equal to his courage, out of the fuper ahundance of his Naval Power, to fend the Count d'Estrees, with a Royal Fleet to the Indies, which to the shame of the English and Hollanders, makes those Conquests, of which the consequences will not fail to trouble those two Nations hereafter, and to be most cruelly tormented and incommoded in their most Essential and Capital Interests both of Estate and Commerce.

And as if it were not enough in so many different Countreys to make all the Progresses above-mentioned, we are seriously to consider that this same Monarch by his vast Banks of ready money is able not only nobly to support his Armies in all those parts by Sea and Land in so many different and distant Countreys; but

also in his Cabinet by the same means of his vast treasures, and the dexterity and vigilancy of his Miniwonderful manner, the power of the Swede, against all the Opposition that has attacqued him, and in the heart of the Empire to controule and manage those Princes, who under the counterfeit and false Title of Neutrality, by the affistance of the ready money of France, keep considerable Armies onFoot, which upon the least mistortune that should befall the Empire, would be ready to take hold of the opportunity to the diladvantage of the Empire. By the same interest of his readymoneyhe not only governs the fecret Counsels of Poland, but so orders his affairs that the publick Diets of that Kingdom applaud the fuffrages of the fame Court in those very points, which according to the Rules of Judicious Policie, will certainly ruine by the Consequences all the chief Priviledges of that Republick. By the fame

same means he governs the Politick Dyets of the Cantons of Switzerland, in fuch a manner, that though that Nation, by the Conquest of Franche Comte, do perceive a curb to be put in their mouths, which may be a means to bring them into flavery, nevertheless they still furnish him, through an infufferable blindness, with the best of their men,on purpose to assist him to over-run the rest of Europe, as if after all the rest come to be fubdu'd and vanquish'd, this Republic alone would be able to relift the power of France, when her victorious Monarch fliall advance four feveral wayes to attack it with all his Forces

But these are not the bounds that limit the Influence of the French Money; it spreads it self yet more wonderfully. Italy is replenish'd with persons of great wisdom and fore-sight; and without all contradiction that Nation of all Europe is naturally the most capable to dive into all the consequences that may happen upon

the progress of his Most Christian Majesties designs; nevertheless by an Enchantment till now unheard of, the Potentates and Republicks of that part of Europe, remain unani-moully buried in an unconceivable Lethargy, and this at a time, when they see by the successes of his Most Christian Majesty in Sicily, the flames of a War ready to be kindl'd in their own Countrey, and that too in fuch a part, as has alwayes prov'd fatal to it, and that from the same part, as alfo from Pignerol & Monaco they find the French Armes affured of three infallible Ports that give them free entrance by three different wayes without any Possibility for any Power of Christendom, if the Empire and Spain be once brought to fubmit, to prevent their misfortune.

But if the Mercenary humour of

But if the Mercenary humour of the Swiffer, and the foftness of the Italians, may seem to furnish those Nations with any excuse, whether good or bad, to shake off the blame from themselves for not having hitherto

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done any part of their Duty, what can England say for it self, a Nation formerly of all Europe most fierce and jealous of their Liberty? In re gard that at the same time, while his Most Christian Majesty carries Valenciennes, Cambray and St. Omers in the very view of that Nation, she fowarlike and so jealous heretofore of the Successes of the French, stands. pauling and fleg natickly making it. a Question, whether it may be convenient for her to Arm, and with her ancient courage to cause aRestoration of those places into the hands of their ancient Masters: or whether the shall apply her self to the unprofitable wayes of mediation, where. the Frauds and delayes of the French are to be every day encountred. This it is that causes us to fay, that the Seine now triumphs over the maritime Grandeur of England, and that France by vertue of one of her chief. Master pieces, and some certain golden Sacrifices, has found a means to lull asleep the English Sampson, that having ; C5.

having cut off the locks of his hair, the may be able to make her felf master of his Honour and his Puissance.

Neither is it here that the politick managements of the Counfels of France make a stop: For the ministry of France has not only acquir'd almost an universal control in all the Courts of Christendom, from which those of Vienna and Madrid have not been exempted; but it is also certain, that by his penfions of several Millions, neither the deceas'd Grand Visier, nor the Cham of the Precopite Tartars, even to the last Peace with Poland, did act otherwise than according to the directions and defires of the Most Christian King; of which the last wars and the Peace with Poland have furnish'd us with a lamentable but authentic Proof, and is to us a farther Argument that he who fucceeds in that charge, coneurs in the fame Politicks with his Predecessour; and that his Most Christian Majesty is not unmindful of his Addresses to him. And it is

observable, that no sooner has the Muscovite threatned the Swede with a War upon Livonia side, but the Great Turk has menaced the Muscovite with an Invasion of his Territories with all his Forces.

If then his Most Christian Majesty by the fole and only Forces of his . own Kingdom, at a time when he is . constrain'd to keep in pay above a hundred thousand men, without any Hyperbole, as well in Garrison as in : the Field, in the parts adjoyning to the Spanish Provinces, and his neighbouring Conquests, yet for all this makes fuch irreliftable Progreffes as well by his Armes as with his money, I leave it to all rational perfons to judge, what he will be able : to do, after he has finished the Conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, for. that he will be then not only difcharg'd of the most considerable part of his care and Expence, but that he will be also master of a Countrey, that by means of its ordinary Sublidies will be able to furnish with moneyy

money to pay an Army of fifty thousand men, with all the charges thereto belonging. And that in the sameCountreys he shall be supplyed with men, Souldiers and Officers as good as any in Europe. That the Empire, Spain, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and England more especially have reason to tremble at the thoughts that fuch a thing should come to pass, if they do not rather arm their whole puissance, and undauntedly both in general and particular make it their business to prevent the same. For certainly it is their common Interest, since that if such a Conquest should be effected by the French, the infallible loss of all their Liberties would follow next.

And for the more home urging of this matter, that we may give you to understand the fatal Posture of the affairs of Europe at this time, & how advantagious they are to facilitate the designed Conquests of his Most Christian Majesty if once he obtain the entire possession of the Spanish

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Netherlands, we are feriously to confider, that as for Germany, after fucha fuccess of the French Force, his Most Christian Majesty will be in a condition, not only to support his Alliances, as he does in Svedeland and Poland, to in other parts of the Empire, but also to enable those Alliances to advance their heads without any danger. For by that correspondence which this Monarch keeps with the Ottoman Court, beingable to prevent for some years the Turk or the Precopite Tartar from making any irruption into Poland, I leave the world to judge how impossible a thing it will be for his Highness the Elector of Brandenburgh to defend Pomerania and Pruffia, while his Most Christian Majesty occasions the attacque of his Provinces, should his Most Christian Majesty, as we have already faid, attacque his Territories of Cleves and Mark, with an Army of forty or fifty thousand men, without any hindrance at all to the same Monarchto maintain

maintain and carryon his Conquests in Lorain, Burg undy, and Luxemburgh, either with as numerous or a

bigger Army in those parts.

Which happening to be true, it will be an infallible Consequence, upon the Conquest of the Spanish-Netherlands, that the Emperor and the Empire will in all probability be constrain'd to bid adieu for ever to whatever depends upon the Patrimonyof the Emperor from the Rhine to the Frontiers of France, in the fame manner as the fame Empire has been already forc'd to do to the three Bishopricks of Toul, Metz and Verdun. For the Dutchies of Cleves and Juliers being fubdu'd all of a fudden, we may easily foresee that two things will infallibly come to pass. First, that the Imperial Army, or at least so much as relates to the Ele-Ctor of Bavaria and his friends in the Empire, will be forc'd to keep on the other side of the Rhine, perhaps in a posture of single defence, while the Princes of Westphalia, either compelled

led by the necessity of the time, or in pursuance of their own obligations, shall joyn with France, as being thereto already well inclin'd and dispos'd.

The second is, that Holland being humbled and brought down by the calamities and loss sustain'd in the present war, or the Conquest already made, shall be forc'd to agree to some dishonourable peace; and that with fo much the more reason, in regard that by the loss of the Spanish Netherlands, and the Dutchy of Cleves, it will be out of all hope of being fuccour'd from any part, unless it be from England, from whence we know that that Republick can promise to themselves but little favour, fo long as the French shall have the chiefest Influence in that Court.

Now the Empire being reduc'd to this Extremity, it is most certain that nothing can follow but the total Ruine of the same Empire, if by any peace at the discretion of the Ministry of France, the Hollanders

ders are forc'd to satisfie the designs of the Ambitious Monarch of that Nation.

The Empire and Holland being thus humbl'd and brought down, we must conclude that France will be at liberty to choose for the subject of its Triumphs Spain, Italy or England,

at its own pleasure.

As for Spain, two things being viewed and confider'd; the first, its natural depopulations; the fecond the want of fortifi'd places in the heart and Bowels of the Kingdom, it is most certain that there is nothing but its scarcity of Provisions and victuals in the very centre of it, that can fave it from an Universal Invasion from France. But let the. scarcity of Victuals be what it will, that can be no obstruction, but that, his Most Christian Majesty, notwithstanding those natural defects, entring by the passages of Fontaraby, with an Armyonly of thirty or forty thousand men, and by the passages of Catalogne with the same number,

by the means of these two Armies, would in two Campagnes be able to make himself master of Navarr, Arragon, Catalogn, and the Kingdom of Valencia, and after that having well fortisted his Frontiers, may be in a condition to constrain the King of Spain to become his Tributary for the Kingdom of Castele, and after that to grant him what part he shall desire of his Territories in Italy, and the West Indies, which is an affair not altogether unworthy the serious resection of England.

As to Italy there are four things to be consider'd. First the importance of those Posts which his Most Christian Majesty has already got possession of, in three different parts of the Country, by means whereof he has a free entry into Italy, which

way foever he pleases.

The fecond is the natural division of Italyinto several littlestates, which are for the most part very inconsiderable, & will be ready to joyn with the

the French Monarch, if they are not

already his creatures.

Thirdly that Italy, formerly the most generous Nation in the world, by the fatal viciflititude of things is now become the most soft and effeminate. The fourth is, that his Most Christian Majesty is master of the Italian Sea. Who foever then confiders all these things, will be eafily convinc'd, that if Lewis the 14th. affail Italy with all his forces, that nation will not be in a condition to make any more reliftance against him, than it did against Charles the Biglith, and that if Lewis gets a footing once within it, ir will not be fo easie to drive him out, as it was Charles the Eighth. For both the Genius's, Politicks and forces you have to deal withall are far different, as also the Conjunctures of former opportunities from those Moreover we are to confipresent. der that upon an irruption of his Most Christian Majesties forces in-

to the most delightful part of Christendom, Italy can have nothing to rely upon but the strength of her own native forces; for any succour she can expect, I see none in a cafe to afford it her but the Turk, Germany and Spain being Supposed to be brought so low as not to be in a condition for any fuch effort. Nor do I think that the Swiffes dare undertake any fuch enterprize, or if they should, that their strength would prove any thing confiderable. From all which reafons I determinately conclude, that if France attaque Italy, which 'tis very probable he will do after he has attaqu'd and fubdu'd the Empire and Spain, Italy will be entirely loft, and the Court of Rome it felf will be glad to draw her felf out of the broiles, by conferring the same honours, & granting the same priviledges to Lewis the 14th, as she did formerly to Charlemaigne, and several of his fuccessours, that being one of the principal Articles which she must

must make use of to satisfie the vast ambition and soaring designs of this Monarch

These great things being thus brought to pass, there will nothing remain to his Most Christian Majesty, but to subdue all his neighbours, and to bring the Sritzers and the English under his Yoak.

For the first I have said it and will say it again, I cannot tell how the Cantons and Confederate Swiffes can be in a condition to defend themselves, against all the efforts and affaults of his Most Christian Majesty, they who have not one fortifi'd place in all their Territories, and who are also often divided in respect of their Religion; and when they Thall be affail'd on all fides, from Iraly, France, Burgundy and Germany. Against which attempts should they prove fuccessful, they would be more worthy of honour, than their Ancestors ever were, for all

their victories formerly obtain'd, against the ancient Dukes of Austria

and Burgundy.

As for Engl. I know that Nation is warlike even to the height of valour, I know that Nation abounds with persons of great gravity, judgment and capacity to penetrate into the deepest mysteries of State Politicks. I know moreover that the natural Situation of Engl.being a kind of fortification and bulwark, that it feems invincible against all the attempts and deligns of her enemies, and that joyning all these circumstances to what the is able further to do, confidering the natural antipathy which every true English man naturally preserves in his breast against the French Nation, we may from thence conclude, that his most Christian Majesty will find it a very difficult task to bring that famous Island under his subjection; and that though he should make a conquest of it, yet it will be a labour as difficult to keep it.

it. But on the other side it would be to make a wrong judgment of the Politicks of the French Ministry, to imagine, that if they undertake either the destruction or the Conquest of England, they would make use of their own forces, without some plausible pretence, to deprive fo great a King, their Allie, of his Dominions. France is too cunning and diligent in herPolitick Managements, not to make use of more refin'd methods of craft and Intrigue. And it is a certain and real argument, that the French Politicks are already at work for the ruin and destruction of England, if by a Heroick and univerfal arming of the whole Nation, the English do not put themselves into a posture both by Sea and Land to stop the progress of his Most. Christian Majesty, and the unwaryproceedings of those among them, who joyn and closewith the French Monarch to the utter ruin of their Native Country.

Is a there is a necessity, to take notice of this piece of Truth, and to dive into the Bottom of two things, the natural designs of the Court of England; and secondly, the condition wherein his Most Christian Majesty will be, after a compleated Conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, by means of such formal Succours as he shall send into England, to bring about the designs of the prevailing party to triumph at length over the unwary coming of the one, and the weakness of the rest.

As for the real designs of the interested Courtriers at this conjuncture, we may conclude them to be such undoubtedly, and the same with those that engag'd the English, at the beginning of the present Wars, to confederate with his Most Christian Majesty, against the Republick of the United Provinces, and by consequence against all the Allies of that Republick.

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And a most notorious proof of this asfertion is this, that without doubt England it felf did not so well ponder and weigh those truths which I am now going to advance, on purpose to let Christendom apparently understand the inevitable danger into which all Christendom must of necessity fall, by being forc'd to Submit to the yoke of France, through the Conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. Now England being sensible of this Truth, and feeing withal that by the continuance of these Successes, his most Christian Majesty will be in a condition to keep up an Army of above 150000 fight. ing men, for which he will have no employment, if he do not fend them against England; and yet lying still, and not using any endeavours to hinder the Progress of these Successes; we must of necessity conclude, that England acts according to the same principles which engag'd her to confederate at the beginning of the war with France; and that her mediation abroad does only tend to do the French some more important kindness, to bring to pass the designs of that Court, than she could do by the affiftance of her Arms and a publick Declaration of War, which might be a means to discover, and put a stop to the conduct of felf-interest.

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And it is an irrefragable proof, that the Self-interested, and the French Party in England are firm in the said Design, for that when the Muscovite threatned the Swede with an Invalion of Livonia, at the same time that, by the Management of France, the Great Turk also threatned the Muscovite with an Irruption into his Dominions, in case he invaded the Swede; the French Party in England, at the same time threatned the Grand Czar that if he medled with the Swede, they would fend a confiderable Fleet of men of War into the Baltick Sea: which proves not only what I have already declar'd, as to England, but also that France, the Turk, and the French Party in England, observing the same measures, without being any longer able to conceal them, have form'd such a League, which, together with the Branches of it, that extend themselves into many Parts of Europe, make

make it evident, what apprehensions Christendom ought to have of the Enterprizes of his most Christian Majesty, to which his Confederates are made instrumental, either through Unwariness or Self-interest.

Now it being thus evident that England acts as a Co-partner with France, some may be nice to examine the general and particular aim of such Proceedings.

I shall say nothing of the publick treaty between England and France, at the beginning of this War, only that therein we may find two

things.

First, That if the French and Popish Party in England do resolve to persist in the observation of the said Treaty, that then, upon the loss of the Spanish Netherlands, to the ancient Owners, England will be put to a hard choice, either to forgoe her ancient Rights and Priviledges to the Will of that same Self-

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e fSelf-interested Popish Party, or esse, with all their Might, to withstand the united Force of the French King, and the French and Popish Party, in England, that shall attempt to constrain them to such a Compliance.

The fecond is this, That in regard it is impossible that the English should willingly submit to such a Subjection, so it will be impossible for them to hinder the French from landing, so long as the aforesaid Power prevails; who, before they quit their hold, nay, before they land, will be sure to have some strong Fort or Post assigned them for their Security, as is usual in such cases.

Which, if it fall out in this manner, who is so blind as not to see, that England being reduc'd to these Terms, it follows, that France, by the Triumphs of politick management, and by the minitable Subtilty of it's Ministers, will not on-

ly be in certain Condition, by fomenting the Troubles, to bring about the total Ruine of England, in regard that the Fortune of the prevailing Party, and consequently of the Kingdom, will be at his disposal; but also by the means of such a favourable Conjuncture, after he has look'd on, while the English cut one another's Throats, to come in and master both Parties in the same manner as Hengest and Horsus, Generals of the Anglo-Saxons, being call'd in by Vortiger to affift him against the Romans, Picts, and Scots, overcame, not only all the Enemies of Vortiger, but he himself and all his Forces. Or, as more lately, the Turk o'recome the King of Fez in Africa, who had call'd him in to his Assistance against Don Sebastin King of Portugal.

It may be thought perhaps, that I have spok'n too freely; but so it was, that the Son of Creefus, King

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of Lydia, being born dumb, feeing a Souldier with his Weapon advanced, ready to kill his Father, spoke then, that never spoke before: Who then cannot but speak, that fees his Native Country ready to be set together by the Ears, by a prevailing French and Popish Party? For to declare who I am, I am an English man, born and bred up in the Roman Catholick Faith; but by the Grace and Favour of God, reclaim'd from those Erroneous Opinions and Doctrines, both as to Faith and Politicks, with which my Studies at Leige had infatuated me.

Now, as to the opportunity of being an English Man, and a Roman Catholick, gave me that Advantage to be admitted into several private Conferences held at Paris and London among those of my own Nation and Religion; and for that I had thereby the means to penetrate to the Bottom, and to discover the Malignity of the present Designs:

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It is the particular Knowledge of the present Misfortunes, which, together with my Conscience and my Honour, have caused me to put Pen to Paper, as one that would be accounted faithful to my Country, and a true Christian, to advertise my dear Country, that these Miifortunes which I have presupposed, are fo much the more likely to come to pass, considering that the French Ministry, having prudently foreseen, that it is impossible for his most Christian Majesty to pretend to the Conquest of the Spanish Low Countreys, unless he be secure of England, have made it the chiefest Master-piece of their Crast and Cunning to separate the Interest of the English Ministry from that of the Kingdom, and make them two distinct things: For the one having made the other believe, that if they would but sacrifice the Spanish Netherlands to his most Christian Majesty, that then he would gratifie

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the other with the Conquest of the Spanish Indies, the Wealth of which places, would put the French-Englist Party into such a Condition, as never to want, or feara Parliament. This is the Knot which ties France and England together; but because the French Party in the Court of England as wifely forefaw, that it was impossible to form a party in England against the Priviledges and Interest of the Kingdom: For that very reason it was, that they pretended to let on Foot the pretence of Religion; and because it was well known, that there was a great Number of Roman Catholicks in England, and those too, generally very zealous for their Religion, though as generally very ignorant; therefore it was, that his Highness the D. of York embrac'd the Roman Catholick Religion, and afterwards, to declare himfelf openly for the same Party; which he never did do, till he had a full prospect, after the D.4

of the weakness of the Confederacy in opposition to France, and that the Forces of the latter were sufficient to beat all the rest put together, unless England struck in to their Assistance.

Upon this ground it was, that after the Arrival of the Dutchess of Orleans at Dover, so many Courriers were seen to post between Paris and London; neither the Peace between England and Holland, nor any thing else that happen'd since or before this War, being able to stop the Career of these Proceedings.

Upon this Confidence it was, that many French Priests came into England in such Numbers, that besides that every Corner of London was full of them; it is most certain, that there is not a Ciry or confiderable Town in England, Scotland, or Ireland, where these Indiscreet Zealots have not got Footing.

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From hence it was, that the Court of Rome, which was not ig-norant of these Proceedings, so much rejoye'd at the beginning of this War which France and England, made at the same time against the Commonwealth of the united Provinces; though that Court has had cause sufficient to understand the Nature of the French Zeal, by what has happen'd through the Power of the French Armies, to one of the Ecclefiaftical Electors of the Empire, as in the most part of the Churches of his Capital City.

Upon this ground it was, that the last Parliament was prorogu'd for eighteen Months, which ended not till the overture of this present Seffions, and all to gain time to gain the Members to their Party, wherein we had like to have felt the fatal

Consequences of their Success.

Now, I say, That this Misfortune is so much the more likely, by how much it appears to be certain, that the

King

King of France is in a Condition, before a year come about, to make a Conquest of the greatest part of the Places and Provinces of the Spanish Netherlands, and thereby be enabl'd to subdue all the rest of his Enemies; and then by means of Sorceries in England, to maintain continual Divisions in that Kingdom, and by vertue of those Divifions, to waft over a confiderable part of his Forces for the support of his Party, and so at length, to make himself Master of them, and the whole Nation. In which Attempt, it will be the more easie for France to succeed, in regard, that England may be certainly affur'd, that there are, within the very Center of her Dominions, no less than fifty thoufand Papists, whose Consciences are govern'd by French Monks and Priests, and consequently, ready to take Arms upon first Opportunity, in pursuance of their Designs, and to joyn with twelve thousand Paon,

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pists more, that now serve in the Armies of France, which would certainly stick close to the French upon their landing in England. Now I fay this, That this 'tis which England may conclude to be certain, with fo much the more Credit and Reason to be believ'd, because the Memoirs, Rolls, and Instructions, have not been conceal'd from me; and all these things maintain'd and carry'd on by the Management of the Miniftry and Counfels of France: whereby my dear Country may fee what is preparing against her, both within and without, for her total Destruction, for which, there is no other Remedy, but by a general Resolution, to lay aside all disputes of Religion, which the indifcreet Zealots of all Sects unwarily fet afoot, and to bestir themselves. for the effecting of five things. The first, to joyn in a league of Confederacy with the House of Austria, and the - the Hollanders, and not to separate until there shall be a Peace made to the sull Satisfaction of all in general, and every one in particular. Secondly, in case the Parliament that is now in Being, do not act more cordially than they have done, for the Honour and Interest of the Nation by their humble Representations and Addresses, to beseech his Majesty to call another.

Thirdly, to implore the Expulsion of all the French Emissaries, of what quality soever, out of all the three Kingdoms, without Exception.

Fourthly, to recall, by an authentick Decree, under pain of Felony, all the English and Scotch who are now in the French Service; for as for the natural Irish, it will not be amis, to let them stay behind, and wast themselves in the Wars: for though they be Roman Gatholicks, yet are they as fanatical

in the Faith of that Church, as the weak Sectaries of the Protestant Religion, are in reference to their Tenents, and consequently, dangerous

Thorns in a Kingdom.

Fifthly, To let forth a Navy as powerful as the Nation is able to provide, of which, the principal Officers must be such as are no way leven'd with the felf-interest of the French Popish Faction; and to furnish this Navy with such a number of men, as may be able to make an Invalion into fuch a part of France, as shall be thought most convenient, worthy the ancient Honour of the Nation; to which purpose, the Heads of the Parties in France may be consulted, and never to part with such places as shall be taken by the English Arms, till his most Christian Majesty shall be constrain'd to submit to Equity and Justice, and to make such a firm and folid Peace as may establish the Repose of Christendom, and reftore

store a Calm to Europe, and which may secure the English Nation from all her present Fears and Alarums. Tis by a Conduct of this Nature, that the Kingdom of England may be able, generally to prevent the Tempest with which the insatiable Ambition of his most Christian Majesty is preparing to overwhelm it, and which seems to be absolutely inevitable, unless vigorously remedy'd by such means as these.

By a Conduct of this nature, the whole Body of the Roman Catholicks in England, returning to their Allegiance, and coming to open their Eyes, might at length be brought to see, that it is impossible for a Prince, who has been the occasion of the slaughter of so many millions of Christians within these few years, for the only Satisfaction of his Ambition; who, led by the same ambitious principles, has made slight of all the Solemn Oaths which life took in the Island of Faisans,

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before him whom he adores for God, before his Altars, that it is impossible, I say, for them to think that such a Prince would trouble his Conscience what Religion were professed in England: only that it would serve him for a plausible pretence, after he had overturn'd all the rest of Europe, to make an Inundation upon the Cities and Habitations of my dear Countrymen, to burn and massacre, to ravish our Wives and Daughters, and fack and ruine the whole Nation, as he has already done, and still does, in Lorrain, Burgundy, Alsatia, and the Spanish Netherlands, though Peopled by Roman Catholicks. And indeed these Preventions seem therefore the more necessary, by how much the more true it is what I say. For, that my Brethren may understand me, the Dispute is not here about Religion: that's but the mantle which covers the Defign of the Popishly affected Party and

and their Leaders, to keep off the fitting of Parliaments. For if his most Christian Majesty keep his word with that Party, the Spanish Indies, with all their Wealth and Riches,- will belong to them, by means whereof, there will be no necessity for the calling a Parliament; but it shall be in the power of that Party, to keep up an Army of Foreigners in England so long as they please, and thereby to make themselves the absolute Masters of the Laws and Liberties of the Subject. On the other fide, if his most Christian Majesty break his Word with the Popish-English Faction, and conquer the Spanish Indies for himself, which is most probable, (it being no part of Richilen's Politicks) which Lewis the 14th treds in step by step, to take much head to the observation of Treaties, (as Spain too cruelly experiments at this time) I leave the World to judge what will become of Eng-Tand.

Leagues from the Coast of France, when the Monarch of that Nation having joyn'd to the rest of his Conquests the Spanish Indies, who will then, by means of his vast Wealth and Riches which he draws out of this Island, to famish this Kingdom, and consequently, when he pleases, to make himself Master of it, there being rhen no Power in Europeable

to prevent it.

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By this Reflexion it may be seen, that if Spain falls, all Enrope falls, not excepting England; and it is yet in the only power of England to prevent this; there is a necessity to have recourse to this Remedy, as we should run to quench a Fire that had seiz'd upon White-hall; that is to say, there is not a moment to be lost, if England intends not to perish in the General Desolation. Religion, Charity, and the General Interest of the Kingdom, demand this Diligence, that my dear

dear Countrey would unanimously agree to give that powerful Assistance to that ancient Allie, and by saving her self heroical, to acquire the Honour of having preserved the whole Body of Christendom from that universal Shipwrack, with which the French Fury threaters it.

I know that by means of that cold Poison which the Emissaries of France infinuate, and fow about in all parts, and which is more efpecially naturaliz'd and intruded into England, as being most proper to calm the tempestuous Jealoulies of that Nation; there are some that aver with some Probability, that should England be quiet and not affist the Conféderates with her Arms, yet that there may be plausible Expedients found out to make an honourable Peace between all the Puissances now at Wars. But my dear Country must know, that this was only a Propofal y

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pofal hatch'd in the Cabinet of the French Ministry, to amuse and blind England, and with her all Europe: and that I may in three words make out this Truth, befides what I have faid already, I beseech the Reader to observe, that suppose this very day, by the Mediation of England, there should be a Peace fign'd, which I believe very uulikely to be done, for feveral Reasons too long to be here inserted: We must needs say, that in the natural Condition of Affairs at present, this Peace cannot be concluded, but to the great Advantage of France, as also, for the Interest of her Allies; which being true, two things will infallibly happen upon a Conclusion made in that manner: the first, that the Empire, Spain, and Holland, will retire to their several Homes, weary and harass'd by the Inconveniences of the War; the fecond, that his most Christian MaMajesty, beside the real Honour and Advantages which he shall get by this War, shall be furnish'd with an Army of a hundred thousand men, as brisk Souldiers as any in Europe; which for several Reasons of State and War that fpeak of themselves, he will never disband. Now if the prevailing difaffected Party in England persist in their Designs of bringing all things under an Arbitrary Power, I ask any true Englishman, whether it be the Interest of England by a Peace of the Nature above recited, that France should be in a Condition, by the loan of an Army of fifty thousand men, which he can easily spare to his Party in England, by an Invalion of that Force, to procure the Ruine of our Country in one year.

Moreover, it behoves us to obferve, that in case such a Peace should be made, it would be of no

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ther Service to France, than to nable him, in less than three years, y the Recruits of his Treasuries nd Finances, securing his Intreagues England, in the North, and among he Princes of the Empire, while he Rhine being without any guard, nd it may be the Great Turk enred Hungary, to powre himself vith a Hundred Thousand Men ino the Spanish Netherlands, and the impire, which is no more than to ecoyl, that he may return with a reater Force, and to take time to onfult his Measures, how to war vith less Danger, and more Success; which is no more for the Diffressed, than to run out of the Frying-pan into the Fire. the Lion is out of his Den, the Hunters are at his Heels; and there is no more to be done, than to spread the English Toils to the Sea Coast-ward, and there to post the Hunts-men. We owe this Charitable Affiltance to our Most Ancient Fellow-Citizens, and the na-

natural Subjects of England. A fair Opportunity offers it self gloriously to reunite to the Crown of our Mo narch, those Flowers that ought to be inseparable from it. Those un fortunate People, oppressed by the Power of the French Tyranny ftretch forth their Arms to us; le us not abandon them any longer to the Fury of that despotick Power as being the only means to restore both our own, and the Peace of the Empire, so necessary to put it into a Condition, to be able to refift the Violence of the Common Enemy of the Christian Faith. I say, this is the only means, to the end, that my dear Country, abus'd and intoxicated with French Poylon, may not be so blinded, as to run blindly into the Snares of those Propositions for Peace, which without the Remedy already propos'd, can prove no other than an infallible Expedient to enflave all Europe.

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I beg the Reader's Pardon if, transported with that Zeal, with which my Heart is enflam'd for the Interest of my Dear Country, I have enlarged my felf upon this point of the Condition and Interest of England: I could not either in Honour or Conscience, refrain from making a Discovery of a mysterious Combination, that goes about to tarnish the Honour of England, should this Misfortune proceed any farther. I declare that my Animolity extends it self no farther, than against those Evil Counsellors, who being corrupted with the Gold of France, have betrayed that Fidelity which they owed both to their Country and their Prince. Moreover, I am an English man, that is to fay, born with my Native Liberty, to declare my Opinion upon fo nice a point, as the Preservation of Law and Liberty, ought to be of every true born English Man: For that in Truth, we have as much Right to mainmaintain that Birth-Right of ours, as our Kings have to maintain the Rights and Priviledges of their Thrones and

Scepters.

But, while I am enlarging upon this Point, some Person, either out of Ignorance or Corruption, may perhaps take upon him to gloss upon this formidable Power, which I have attributed to France, to the end that my dear Country, and all other Princes and People, whose Interest it is to abate the Power of France, may be the better instructed to make a folid and right Judgment of it, both in general and particular, of the formidable Force of France, I defire the Reader to make a true and fincere Parallel between the Reigns of Charles the Fifth, and Francis the First, and the Reigns of Lewis the Fourteenth, and Charles the Second of Spain; for by that only Examen, you will find that I have spoken but very sparingly and modestly of the vast Power

Power of France, which I shall endeavour to make appear by a fuccinct Examination of this Parallel.

Charles the Fifth, under the Titles of Emperour, King of Spain, King of Naples, Sicily, and Sardigna, Duke of Milan, and chief of the Houses of Burgundy and Austria, united in his own Person, the immenfity of a vast Puissance, which, after some Victory obtain'd against his Enemies, gave him the advantage, to dispose of an absolute Power, all the Forces of Germany, the Seventeen Provinces of the Low-Countreyes, Italy and Spain, who by edly under his Banners, to execute the Commands of this Monarch, as, at present, those of France obey the Orders of Lewis the Fourteenth.

Charles the Fifth was undoubtly the greatest Captain, and the greatest Souldier that Christendom had produced for several Ages.

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Charles the Fifth had under him the most Famous Persons, both for Military and Civil Affairs, which either the Empire, or the Monarchy

of Spain ever had.

Germany, Italy, the Provinces of the Low Countries, and Spain, were full of great Armies, vigorous and well-disciplin'd, and the Ocean and Mediterranean Seas saw nothing more noble nor magnificent than the Fleets of that Monarch.

Moreover, this Prince was one that weigh'd, digested, and resolv'd the most difficult and important Assairs, that were handled either in his Military or Civil Councils, and like a second Cesar, confronting in Person all sorts of Perils and Dangers, encourag'd by his presence in all sorts of places, the Valour of his Captains and Souldiers, in all his most important Expeditions.

Notwithstanding, this great Em-

Notwithstanding, this great Emperour, with all the Territories, Forces, and Advantages that he had,

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finding himself necessitated to declare a War against Francis the First of France, who, in all, had not above thirty millions of Annual Income; and although he had withdrawn from the Service of France the Duke of Bourbon, who carried the same sway in that Countrey, which the Prince of Conde may be faid to do now, had nevertheless, fuch an Opinion of the Force of France, that he would not engage himself in that War, till he had first made a League with Henry the 8th, the Pope, and other the most confiderable Princes of Europe.

And yet, notwithstanding all his Precaution and Wariness, Experience tells us, that Francis the First was in a Condition, not only to defend himself against all the Violence of that League, but that also, had it not been for that same accident, and which was but an accident, of his being taken Pris'ner at the Battel of Pavia, Francis the First

had found the Emperour work enough, and given him his hands full,
feeing, that after he was fet at liberty, he was so powerful as to
constrain the Emperour to grant
him several mitigations in reference
to the Treaty of Peace which he
had sign'd during his Imprisonment,
and that he left his Kingdom in that
condition which it has invincibly
maintain'd and preserv'd, not withstanding all its Civil Wars, against
the Puissance both of the Spanish
Monarchy and the Empire.

Now to make a just and exact parallel between those, and the Conjunctures of these Times, we must observe, that Francis the First, as we have already declar'd, had not above thirty Millions of Annual Income, and that Lewis the 14th, who now Reigns, at this hour that I write, has infallibly above an hundred and fifty Millions within the

onely circuit of his Kingdom.

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That Francis the First durst not undertake any thing of high Concern, but by the Consent of his Estates General and his Parlaments, and that Lewis the Fourteenth reigns despotically, with an absolute Power over all his Subjects.

That Francis the First had a Charles the Fifth to grapple with, comprehends all the rest, and that Lewis the Fourteenth has onely a Charles the Second, and a Ferdinand to deal with: the one but fixteen years of Age, the other, a Prince, without doubt, endued with all the Heroick Virtues hereditary to those of his most Illustrious House, but of a Disposition placid and pacifick, and who has no other end in opposing the Enterprizes of Lewis the Fourteenth, by Force of Arms, but out of an absolute necessity to prevent the total Ruine of the Empire and his whole Family.

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Charles the Fifth, as he was only King of Spain, and the Territories annex'd thereto, kept always on Foot, upon the Frontiers of Spain, in Italy, and the Low-Countries, great Armies of fix and twenty thousand men a piece: Whereas Charles the Second, having suffer'd great Losses of his Dominions in every Quarter, has not now at this time above thirty thousand effective in all, altho Lewis the Fourteenth attacques him in all his Dominions with Forces more confiderable than ever Charles the Fifth made use of against France.

Charles the Fifth had always ready in his Ports, and upon the Coasts of the Low-Countries, a Navy of sifty men of War, which, having a Correspondence with his Spanish Fleet on the main Ocean, gave Laws to France so absolutely on that side, that we do not find in any History, that ever France durst make Head by Sea against that

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And at this time I do not know that Spain is able to set to Sea six men of War on that side; where France is now so strong, that some Months since, out of the abundance of their number, they had both the Courage and the Force to send a Fleet to the West-Indies, which made there considerable Conquests.

Charles the Fifth, by reason of his Naval Strength in the Mediterranean Sea, and through the convenience of his Portsupon the Coast of Spain, Italy, and Africa, kept, as it were block'd up, in the Ports of Thoulon and Marseilles, all the Naval Force of France: Whereas, the Naval Force of France being fo valtly augmented in those Parts, has fo strangely spread it self, that, being absolutely Masters of those Seas, within these two years, the Spaniards dare no longer appear, but with the Convoyes of some one of their Allies. Charles the Second

has been no way able to prevent his total Ruine, but by Leagues and Confederacies: Lewis the four-teenth sustains himself merely by the force of his Arms. Charles the Second wants both Men and Money, and Lewis the Fourteenth abounds in both.

Charles the Fifth was sole Master of the seventeen Provinces, and Lewis the sourteenth has invaded the chief places of the ten that belong'd to the Spaniards after the Separation of the ten that form'd the Common-wealth of Holland, all which he has taken from Charles the second, together with the County of Burgundy entirely.

In a word, I cannot speak it too often, the Spanish Monarchy is tumbling, & with that, all the rest of Europe, if Europe, but more chiefly England, do not counterpoise the formidable Force of France, to prevent her being invaded, and forc'd to submit to the same Yoak, which he

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This is that which I have to say upon this Parallel, from which, by the natural Deductions and Consequences that may be drawn, it plainly appears, that I may come to my Conclusion, that by the Loss of Valencienns, Cambray, and St. Omers, in three weeks time, his most Christian Majesty is in a fair way, if there be no stop put to his Successes, to triumph over the rest of Europe.

From this Argument it is that I conclude, that all the Princes and People of Europe who love their own Preservation, their Honour and their Liberty, ought to take the Loss of those three places for a signal and universal Alarum given to all Europe, to run to their Arms, and marshal themselves with all diligence under the Banners of Justice and Equity; to the end, that the Princes who command this gene-

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rous party, may be enabl'd, for the universal good of Christendom, to vanquish those cruel Legions that so victoriously march under the Ensigns of Injustice and Cruelty, and pust up with their Conquests, so insolently advance to the general De-

struction of all Europe.

It is this Alaum that gives warning to Italy to put her self into a posture by vertue of a unanimous League between all her Potentates and Republicks, as also by the Efforts of her Arms, as well by Sea as Land, to drive back all the Forces of France, not only from the Coasts and Island of Sicily, but to expel them, if possible, out of all Italy; and this at a time while the Roman Eagles hold the chief Director of the French Arms in play. Whereas, if Italy neglect so fair an opportunity to prevent the Yoak that threatens them, if the Empireonce fall, the can never be able to repair to great a Loss, and then she can

which are inteparable from Conquests, and of which the Desolations of Alsatia are a dreadful Prospect to lay in tablature before their

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Tis this Alarum that ought to excite the Swifes with all their Allies and Confederates, to lay hold upon this prefent and only Conjuncture, and by an authentick and general Decree of all the whole Nation, to recall all their Forces, out of the Service of the French, and with the same Forces, and others of their Confederates and Allies joyn'd with them, tho it were at their own Expence, which Spain would doubtless n ver allow, to go and wrest from the French the Garrisons of Burgindy, and clear that County of fich bad Neighbours, as being the only Bulwark of their Liberty in the hands of their Majors, if they do not intend to lote the only OpporOpportunity of delivering themfelves from that Slavery to which the Pride and Prosperity of France

defigns them.

Tis this Alarum that puts England in mind of the near Fall of her Honour, and the approaching Loss of her Liberty, if by a noble Attempt worthy of the Valour of the Nation she do not include her self in the present League of Confederacy; and by Acts worthy the English Generosity, she do not endeavour to assume to her self the Glory of having sav'd all Europe in saving her self.

This Alarum tells the Conquering Princes of one part of the Territories of Swedeland, in the Verge of the Empire, that those Territories are sufficiently considerable to reward their Heroick Endeavours, for the Preservation of themselves, though Spain should be utterly unable to gratisse them one Farthing, though he can never without doubt

be brought so low, if the Spanish Netherlands be but preserved.

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This Alarum it is that resounds to all the Princes of the Empire, both in general and in particular, as well those who have hitherto won so much Honour out of Zeal to their Duty, as those who have fuffer'd themselves hitherto to be abus'd, either by the Artifices of France, or the Corruption of their own Servants, that he who directly attacques the Head, directly attacques the Members, and that he who preserves no Respect for the Head, has none for those Princes, that as Members depend upon the Head. The Fortune of the Dutches of Lorrain and Bar, with the Fortress of Pignerol, may give them fenfibly to understand, that neither the respect of Blood, Alliances or Treaties, are of that Re-Araint; but that the Maxims of the French Politicks, will facrifice them all to their Ambition.

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The demolishing of the Fortress of Orange, being a sufficient Argument, that there is nothing but the bare honourary Title of Duke and Peer, that is to be tolerated in France.

This same Alarum may also reach the ears of his Holiness, and lethim know, that if the Emissaries of France do flatter him, that the Defigns of that Monarch, are only to extend the Bounds of the Roman Catholick Faith; they are only Cheats and Deceivers: For it is apparent, that the Ambition of France aspires at nothing more than to pull down Imperial Crowns and Princes, purely Roman Catholick. The last peace of Poland, with the Protections which France gives to the Protestants in Hungary, together with the Breaches of the same Ministry with Spain, sufficiently testifie, do but make a Sport at Worthip of the Roman Catholick Faith: It being certain to them, that pene-

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trate into Affairs, that under the name of the Jansenists Party in France, there is with much Circumspection preserv'd and cherish'd a fort of Venom more dangerous to the Pontifical Chair, than whatever Luther or Calvin instituted in Germany: For they were declared, and open Enemies; these keep themselves conceal'd, and close under the Title of Zealous Catholicks, notwithstanding that their Hearts, as they sufficiently demonstrate by their Actions, burn with the same Fury, and it may be with the same Religion of those ancient Northern People that so often took and sack'd the ancient Rome.

The same Alarum Poland seriously ought to take; for that if she unwarily undertake to savour the Designs of his most Christian Majesty, the Enemy of his Imperial Majesty and the Empire, it behoves her to take heed; that she do not engage her self to savour the Destruction Attacks of the Turk; which it behoves Poland to take the more serioully into her Consideration, in regard that it is the Interest of the Empire to take care of the Preservation and Subsistance of Poland.

It is this Alarum that laftly advertises all France, with a continued and mournful found, I speak of the Kingdom in her three Estates, that if fourscore and ten thoufand Gentlemen which are in France do not under the Favour of this present Conjuncture draw their Swords, and joyn with the honest Commonalty, to shake off the Yoak which now oppresses their Necks, the name of Nobility and free people, will be certainly extinguish'd over all that vast and populous Kingdom; in regard, that nothing but the frequent Meeting of the three Estates General of that Kingdom, which is able able to re-establish the Priviledges of those Estates, totally lost: which re-Establishment being never to be brought to pass, but by a universal taking up of Arms throughout the whole Kingdom, it may be certainly faid, that such a Resolution being taken at this Conjuncture, by joyning with those Princes, who are now engag'd in the same War against the Court of France, and that also vigorously maintain'd till such a Re-Establishment were made according to their defire, firm and lasting; there would be no Power upon the Earth which could ward off the Blow, but that his most Christian Majesty would be forc'd to vail Bonnet, and submit to reason and Equity, as well in respect of his Subjects, as in respect of his Neighbours, which is so much the more necessary; by how much it ought to be laid down for a fundamental Maxim, that if by re-establishment

of the Liberties of France, which is not to be done but by the sit-ting of the general Estates of the Kingdom. The Monarch of that Nation cannot be constrain'd to content himself with the ancient Revenues of that Crown; it is absolutely impossible, that any one of his Neighbours can promise to themselves either Peace or Security, which being so considerable and certain as I lay it down, I leave it to Judgment, how much it con-cerns all the oppress'd Nobility of France, not to lay down Arms, till that despotick and Arbitrary Power by some means or other, be absolutely banish'd the Kingdom.

But if the People of this great and vast Kingdom, will be so generous, as to attempt the shaking offa Yoak so heavy and oppressive; the same Alarum admonishes his Imperial Majesty, and his Catholick Majesty, together with their Al-

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lies, that these Worthy and Gene rous Undertakers ought to be fuc cour'd and protected after another manner than those of Bourdeaux, the Britains and Lavedanois were in their late Infurrections; a fatal Experience, giving Light to this most Renowned House of Austria, and it's Allies, that if those Infurrections had been foster'd and succour'd, according to the powerful Sollicitations of their Deputies abroad, his most Christian Majesty had not been in a condition to have made those notable Conquests which he has done these last Compaigns in the Spanish Netherlands, nor to furnish the Swede and others with fuch confiderable Sums of Money, from whence those Consequences are to be drawn that speak loud enough of themselves to justifie the folidity of my Assertion in this particular.

But if the Renowned House of Austria, with all their Allies and Confederates, who are now in Arms against France, have any Interest fo Supreme and importunate as I suppose they have, not to lay down Arms, till this Despotick Power be banished out of France: How much does it concern England to suppress that formidable Power fo threatning to them? I am fatisfied, that only the Infinuations and Profuseness of the Court of France for these many years, have began a Self-interested and Popishly affected Party in that Nation, which laid the Foundations of all the Catastrophees that have appear'd upon the English Theatre, and which no doubt, the same Parties are endeavouring with the same Vigour to renew, if not prevented by a generous Confederacy of the English Nation against the Common Enemy, there being no other way to Rop the Current of his most Chri-Stian stian Majesties Profusions abroad, by that means, according to the natural Description which he expoles to the World of his Absolute Power over his Subjects, to inflame the Minds of other Princes with the Came Ambition. And there are two Points fo effential to the Interest of England, besides those that I have already related, that though the Renowued House of Austria, with their Allies, were utterly unable either to foment or to protect an Enterprize of this Importance, England alone however ought to undertake such an Heroick Work, the Success whereof is so link'd to its Interest, that, if I had not refolv'd here to conclude, I could make it out by many more undeniable Reasons, that England cannot support it self but by the reestablishment of the French Liberty. Upon this Pole moves the whole Being of the Laws and Liberties of England, as well as the UniUniversal Calm and Tranquility of Europe, and the Repose of Christendom. And because, perhaps, I may be thought by some to have spoken too much in the display of so much Truth, I shall say no more, leaving to every one his full Liberty to think and act according as his parts, his Honour, and his Conscience shall suggest; and so I conclude.

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